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Conclusion 
The Moral Responsibility of Firms: 
Past, Present, and Future 
Eric W. Orts 
ENVIRONMENTAL FRAUD AT VOLKSWAGEN 
In 2009, my family bought a new Volkswagen Jetta diesel relying on high 
scores this model received for its environmental characteristics. I don't recall 
the rating service we used, but the top-rated passenger car along this dimen-
sion was the Toyota Prius, and the VW Jetta came in a close second. We 
preferred the performance and "pick up" in driving the Jetta. In 2015, how-
ever, we learned along with millions of other owners of VW automobiles one 
reason for the difference in performance: VW had lied. Our Jetta did not 
deserve the high ratings it received for its environmental characteristics 
because VW had intentionally installed software designed to fool routine 
government testing. A "defeat device" programmed the engine to run with 
lower emissions when tested, but then shifted during normal driving condi-
tions to spew into the atmosphere twenty to forty times more harmful 
nitrogen oxide than permitted under the relevant environmental regulations 
in the United States and Europe (Davenport and Ewing 2015; Hakim 2016b). 1 
Another corporate fraud scandal was born: prosecutors unleashed, product 
recalls ordered, and class action lawsuits filed. As this book goes to press, the 
story of VW's large-scale environmental fraud has only begun, but it serves to 
illustrate the practical relevance of the central question addressed in this book 
of the moral responsibility of firms-or not. 
1 VW has admitted to fraud in the United States, but has claimed that its practices regarding 
the emissions software devices were legal in Europe (Hakim 2016a). 
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Volkswagen has admitted to its deception, and everyone can agree that what 
it has done was morally wrong. I feel cheated, as do millions of other consumers, 
as do governments around the world. The key question, though, is who exactly 
committed this wrong? A letter sent to consumers by Michael Horn, President 
and CEO of VW America (a subsidiary of the larger German parent), illustrates 
how easy it is to be imprecise and ambiguous about moral responsibility in 
firms. He writes to offer a "personal and profound apology" and admits that 
"Volkswagen has violated your trust." He expresses heartfelt empathy: "I under-
stand and fully appreciate your anger and frustration." He owns the problem 
and makes a promise: "I would like you to know that we take full responsibility 
and are cooperating with all responsible agencies. I can also assure you that we 
are committed to making this right for you-and taking steps to prevent 
something like this from ever happening again" (Horn 2015). 
Notice, though, how easily some of these sentences oscillate between the 
personal and the institutional. Mr. Horn offers a "personal" apology, but as the 
CEO of VW's US subsidiary, he likely has no direct knowledge of the fraud 
perpetrated by engineers and other executives at VW. So his "personal" 
apology is not really personal: it's institutional. He is apologizing as a senior 
executive of VW who has the job of dealing with American consumers 
defrauded by his company. As is ubiquitous in business, he speaks as an 
authorized legal agent of his big firm (see Orts 2015, 53-62) . VW, one of the 
largest automobile companies in the world, employs hundreds of thousands of 
people. Most probably, only a relatively small number of people were 
directly responsible for the skullduggery of creating the deceptive software 
and installing it in millions of VW cars.2 Most probably also, only a relatively 
small number more actually knew about or suspected the mass deception. 
Mr. Horn's ability to offer a "personal and profound apology" to consumers 
like me, then, makes a few rather large assumptions. First, his apology assumes 
that some portion of blame for the wrong can affix to the very large and 
complex firm called "Volkswagen," as well as the individual people who 
actually perpetrated or knew about the deception. Second, Mr. Horn assumes 
that he has authority to speak on behalf of the firm in a manner allowing him 
to apologize to consumers for the wrong in some meaningful sense. 
Notice also that Mr. Horn moves immediately from offering a personal 
apology to admitting that "Volkswagen has violated your trust." But what does 
this statement mean in the context of this scandal? Again, there are specific 
employees and executives who were morally responsible for designing and 
installing the "defeat devices," and there are probably more who either ordered 
2 As of this writing, an internal investigation at VW reported that only nine people have been 
suspended who are suspected of the participating in the fraud (Ewing 2015). Additional 
questions concern when and how many executives learned of the problem and may have failed 
to disclose it (Ewing 2016). 
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this to be done or knew about and condoned these actions. Moreover, the 
owners of Volkswagen at the time of the deceptive activity (which occurred 
approximately from 2009 to 2015) have likely profited from the fraudulent 
activity. Executive and employee bonuses may well have been paid for hitting 
performance targets in sales and profits that might not have been reached 
without the environmental fraud. (On the idea of environmental fraud and the 
role of citizens in the private enforcement of environmental laws more 
generally, see Orts 1995, 1324; Thompson 2000.) VW owners who likely 
profited from the fraud embrace a complex category that describes the capital 
structure of the modern firm, including not only shareholders, but also 
bondholders, other creditors, and the company itself in the form of retained 
earnings. (On the complexity of corporate ownership, see Orts 2015, 71- 105).3 
According to the individualist accounts of moral responsibility offered by 
many scholars, including several authors of chapters in this book, to say 
"Volkswagen has violated your trust" is only shorthand for saying "specific 
participants within the company structure of Volkswagen have violated your 
trust." Following this line of reasoning, one may conclude that Mr. Horn's 
statement here is not sensible or coherent. It is not the company as a whole or 
Mr. Horn in particular who has violated customers' trust but rather the 
specific people who are employees, executives, and owners of the company 
who committed the wrong, condoned it, and profited from it. To put the 
problem more starkly, to accept the personification of Volkswagen as the 
relevant "entity" that is responsible for the wrong enables agents, such as 
Mr. Horn, to point to the formal and abstract representation of "the firm" as 
the source of the wrong rather than to hold particular individual people 
responsible. Instead, and more precisely, Mr. Horn might have been encour-
aged instead to say: "Some employees and executives within Volkswagen have 
violated your trust, and they and some owners of the company have profited 
from this violation." Then, when Mr. Horn says that "we are committed to 
making this right for you," he might instead have been encouraged to say: "We 
promise to find out who within our firm is responsible for this wrongful 
behavior, and we will cooperate with government authorities in prosecuting 
them and otherwise bringing them to justice. In addition, we will require any 
of the firm's owners, executives, and employees who have profited from this 
wrongful behavior to disgorge their ill-gotten gains-with an appropriate 
share paid to you as a defrauded customer to compensate you for the harm 
wrongfully done." In other words, for Mr. Horn to attribute blame vaguely to 
VW as a formal and abstract firm and to promise consumers that the "royal 
3 VW's somewhat unusual corporate structure involving a significant "co-determination" role 
for labor unions on its supervisory board as well as a large ownership interest by the government 
of Lower Saxony may have contributed to laxity in oversight (Van der Heyden 2015). But the 
overall problem is generic. 
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we" of VW will "make this right" allows him to avoid saying anything very 
specific about the business participants within the firm who are immediately 
and directly responsible. On this view, Mr. Horn's "personal and profound 
apology" rings hollow. 
OUR CONTRIBUTORS' PERSPECTIVES 
Chapters in this book by John Hasnas, Ian Maitland, David Ronnegard and 
Manuel Velasquez, and Amy Sepinwall track this theme-providing various 
arguments for what might be called the individualist theory of moral respon-
sibility in firms. 
Hasnas argues that recognizing moral responsibility for firms qua firms 
creates a "responsibility deficit" by which individual wrongdoers can escape 
accountability for their actions. He is particularly concerned that this avoidance 
of individual responsibility occurs through punishing "innocent" business par-
ticipants (including employees, shareholders, and perhaps others who suffer 
from penalties imposed on a firm as a whole) rather than focusing on the 
specific individuals who have done or condoned the wrong. (See Chapter 5.) 
Maitland reinforces this argument He maintains that a philosophically 
careless "anthropomorphization" of firms allows a "responsibility deficit" of 
great magnitude, often amounting to abuse that enables the equivalent of a real-
life game of"grand theft corporation." (See Chapter6.) He references Judge Jed 
Rakoff's recent opinions taking US prosecutors to task for allowing large 
corporate settlements of criminal charges in situations in which no individual 
person is convicted or held personally responsible. (See also Rakoff 2014, 2015). 
In a similar vein, Ronnegard and Velasquez advance a set of arguments 
making the individualist case against attribution of moral responsibility to 
organizations, including business firms. They argue that collective organiza-
tions such as firms cannot correctly be said to bear moral responsibility for the 
following reasons. 
(1) Firms are not "agents" (in the philosophical sense) that can be con-
ceived as meaningfully separate from the individual people that 
compose them. 
(2) Firms do not have the capacities of knowledge and intention required 
for moral responsibility. 
(3) Firms do not have capacity to feel emotions needed for moral 
responsibility. 
( 4) Firms cannot "act" in the world themselves and depend instead on the 
direct involvement of real individual people. 
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(5) Attributing moral responsibility to firms often has the unacceptable 
consequence of "punishing" innocent individuals (rehearsing argu-
ments also made by Hasnas and Maitland). 
(6) Firms do not have the "autonomy" required to attribute moral 
responsibility. 
(See Chapter 7.) 
Sepinwall elaborates on the argument that corporations and other business 
firms lack emotions. They are, in her words, "affectless." In particular, firms 
cannot experience "guilt," and it therefore makes no sense to "blame" them for 
wrongdoing. Doing so is also ineffective. (See Chapter 8.) 
These chapters make a strong case for an individualist approach to moral 
responsibility in firms. They build on previous contributions that these and 
other authors have made to advance the argument that attributing moral 
responsibility to firms is philosophically mistaken. (See Hasnas 2010; 
Maitland 1994; Ronnegard 2013, 2015; Sepinwall 2012, 2015a; Velasquez 
1983, 2003. See also Lewis 1948; Miller and Makela 2005). As noted by the 
philosopher Roger Scruton, these arguments follow in a long historical trad-
ition. Centuries ago, Samuel von Pufendorf argued that a corporation is a 
"persona moralis composita," and Wilhelm von Humboldt maintained that 
such a composite person "should be regarded as nothing more than the union 
of its members at a given time." (See Scruton 1989, 245-6) . 
Other scholars, who are also represented in the chapters of this book, 
challenge this individualist theory. They would say that Mr. Horn's attribu-
tions of moral responsibility to Volkswagen as a corporation can be justified. 
The individual actions that caused the fraud affecting millions of vehicles and 
consumers occurred within the formal legal structure of a corporation, and the 
organized authority of this structure of the firm is an indissoluble part of the 
moral wrong that has been committed. VW as an organization is morally 
responsible because it acts as a rational organization with cognitive attributes 
and organizationally shared intentions. On this general view, it is impossible 
to imagine how a fraud on such a massive scale could occur without the 
assistance-even if a widespread, often innocent, and unknowing assistance-
of the thousands of employees and executives who built the offending cars and 
sold them. The entire enterprise of committing fraud on a massive scale would 
not have been possible without the complex capital structure that provided the 
financing to commit the wrong and the internal economic incentives that 
encouraged and condoned it.4 It therefore makes sense to say that "VW has 
violated your trust" and to recognize senior executive agents such as Mr. Horn 
4 It has been noted, for example, that the beginning of the environmental fraud in the United 
States corresponded with a strong commitment and drive of VW's CEO to overtake Toyota as 
the world's largest automobile company (Ewing 2015). 
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as having the legal and moral authority to make a public, if not a "personal," 
apology on behalf ofVW as a firm. It makes sense also for consumers like me 
to feel wronged by the firm itself and to demand a compensatory response. 
Versions of this argument for what might be called an organizational or 
collectivist theory of moral responsibility find support in the chapters collected 
here by Philip Pettit, Michael Bratman, and Peter French, as well as Waheed 
Hussain and Joakirn Sandberg. 
Pettit argues that firms such as business corporations are "conversable 
agents" that act in the world according to set purposes and objectives. They 
"speak" as agents in their interactions with other agents in the world through 
authorized representatives. Business firms organized and operating in this 
manner therefore have the capacity to hold beliefs, express intentions, and 
make promises. In this sense, they have "minds of their own." They are "fit to 
be held responsible" in moral terms when their authorized actions do not 
meet their expressions of collective purpose, belief, and intention. 
(See Chapter 1.) 
Bratman supports the argument for the collective moral responsibility of 
firms at least to the extent that his elaboration of a "shared intention" of 
a group through a sufficient institution of "self-governance" satisfies one 
important criterion needed for moral responsibility. (He leaves open whether 
other criteria exist that may or may not be required to attribute moral 
responsibility to business firms.) Bratman specifies some factors involved in 
the formation of group intentions, including "shared deliberations" and 
"shared policies of procedure." His analysis suggests that "shared intentions" 
created collectively at the firm level may allow for moral responsibility to be 
attributed correctly to firms qua firms. (See Chapter 2.) 
French supplements well-known previous arguments that he has made in 
favor of finding how the moral responsibility of firms can be based on a 
"functionalist or structuralist account of corporate intentionality and respon-
sibility at the time of an action or event" with new reflections about when the 
moral responsibility of a firm for particular actions or consequences may end. 
He illustrates what he describes as the "diachronic" dimension of the problem 
by considering the case of energy firm BP and its responsibility for the massive 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Following a study of the more general 
philosophical problem by Andrew Khoury (2013), French asserts that even 
though BP bears moral responsibility as a firm at the time of the oil spill 
(namely, synchronic responsibility), the firm's responsibility dissipates and 
even disappears over time (namely, diachronic responsibility). This reduction 
and eventual vanishing of responsibility occurs when BP goes through various 
changes in its identity through corporate reorganizations, changes of leader-
ship, and measures expressing atonement taken to address the wrong, such as 
admitting responsibility, paying damages, and other acts of contrition or 
compensation. (See Chapter 3.) 
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Hussain and Sandberg support arguments for the moral responsibility of 
firms by taking what they call a "functional normative" approach to the 
problem. They adopt a constructivist pragmatism and note that business 
firms such as corporations are legal structures. The plasticity of law allows 
Hussain and Sandberg to appeal to a larger value of social welfare or what is 
best for society overall. In their words, "there is no one right way to treat an 
organization or group as a collective agent." Therefore the moral responsibility 
of firms translates into a pragmatic moral and legal question rather than a 
"pre-institutional" moral one. The moral responsibility of firms should be 
found, in other words, when it serves the broader social good to do so. (See 
Chapter4.) 
These chapters that generally support an organizational or collectivist view of 
the moral responsibility of firms also build on other major contributions to the 
literature by these authors, as well as others. (See, for example, Bratman 2007, 
2014; List and Pettit 2011; Pettit 2007, 2008; French 1979, 1995, 1996. See also 
Arnold 2006; Donaldson 1982, 18-35.) 
Is it possible to square the circle of this debate between individualists and 
collectivists? Two of the contributions in the book provide possible options 
going forward into the future that seem compatible with both individualist 
and collectivist accounts of moral responsibility in firms. I will suggest one 
other possible future direction as well, drawing on a legal perspective. 
Kendy Hess suggests that a close philosophical analysis of competing 
positions reveals "an unrecognized consensus" uniting the individualists and 
collectivists (whom she also calls "holists"). She points out that much of the 
debate revolves around ontological, metaphysical, meta-ethical, and methodo-
logical questions about the nature of firms. Nobody denies, though, that ethics 
matter in business. In Hess's words, the "debate over the initial claim that 
there is 'a firm,' or that it can bear moral obligations ... . is not a debate about 
ethics, about whether there are moral obligations in play" (original emphasis). 
Everyone agrees, including everyone writing chapters in this book, that "busi-
ness behavior is subject to ethical norms" in general. Despite the fact that some 
contemporary observations may suggest the contrary, "business is not a 
morality-free zone." Hess encourages a "reframing" that allows for progress 
to be made on examining many practical ethical dilemmas in a manner that 
"brackets" the individualist-versus-collectivist debate. Ethical answers may 
correlate, in other words, to specific practical questions in business ethics 
(and perhaps law too) whether or not one's background view of the grounding 
of moral responsibility relies on seeing "firms as collections of people" or 
"firms qua firms." (See Chapter 9.) 
For example, if one accepts the argument that insider trading is wrong (see, 
for example, Lee 2002; Scheppele 1993; Strudler and Orts 1999), then one can 
also likely agree that steps should be taken within firms-or by individuals 
acting within the structure of firms-to prevent insider trading from 
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happening. All can agree to sanction violations of insider trading without 
agreeing on the moral meta-analysis. If the premise that insider trading is 
wrong is accepted, in other words, then everyone can agree that individuals in 
firms should prevent insider trading and that individuals who commit insider 
trading should be punished, even though individualists and collectivists may 
diverge on whether a firm qua firm can either commit insider trading or be 
rightly punished for it. (On the problem of corporations themselves commit-
ting insider trading, see Loewenstein and Wang 2005.) 
Nien-he Hsieh encourages forward thinking in another direction that both 
individualists and collectivists may support. He urges a focus on the "positive 
duties" that firms qua firms or people acting collectively in firms may owe. 
Much of the long debate about the proper seat of the moral responsibility of 
firms focuses on ethics as a negative constraint: what one should not do. Hsieh 
calls for attention to positive moral duties: what one should do, particularly in 
cases of urgent human need. He builds on work that he and others have done, 
for example, in applying an ethical "duty to rescue" to firms (Dunfee 2006; 
Hsieh 2004, 2006). He extends this view to include positive duties or virtues of 
"beneficence," drawing on the work of Bowie (1999) and Smith (2012), as well 
as positive duties to act in the world following principles of "justice," drawing 
on the work of various theorists including O'Neill (2001), Caney (2013), and 
Dubbink and Van Liedekerke (2014). Examining these "positive" duties and 
virtues can fit within both individualist and collectivist theories of the ethical 
responsibility of firms. (See Chapter 10.) 
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FIRMS 
Finally, I would like to suggest that a closer legal analysis of the nature of 
business firms may lead to some other agreements among individualists and 
collectivists going forward. In a book called Business Persons, I've argued that 
the law plays a very large role in the construction and recognition of what we 
call business firms (Orts 2015). Firms come in many varieties and in different 
legal forms: corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and other 
complex combinations (such as corporate parent-subsidiary structures and 
franchises). And firms range widely in terms of size: from sole proprietors to 
massive multinational enterprises such as VW and BP. In addition, firms may 
adopt different objectives and value orientations. There is no natural law 
requiring "shareholder value maximization" or the pursuit of profits over all 
other values. To be sure, profit-making describes a primary objective of most 
if not all business firms, but this does not mean that it is the only objective. 
As the American Law Institute recognizes, a business corporation has the 
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"primary" objective of profit and economic gain, but it is "obliged, to the same 
extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law," and it may 
"take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as 
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business." Many firms "devote a 
reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, 
and philanthropic purposes," a practice which many statutes sanction and 
many ethical traditions encourage. (American Law Institute 1994, sect. 2.01). 
The normative orientations of family-owned enterprises, which are ubiqui-
tous on the world stage (Landes 2006; Morck and Steier 2007), often imbue 
particular religious or other moral values into a firm's culture and operations. 
The recent high-profile US Supreme Court case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. (2014), which recognized a right of some family-owned firms to 
resist legal obligations on religious grounds, illustrates this phenomenon. (See 
also Orts 2016; Sepinwall 2015b, 2015c.) Statutes establishing benefit corpor-
ations, community interest companies, and other "hybrid social enterprises" 
expand the choice of legal forms to include social or environmental ends as an 
explicit supplement to profit-making (see Orts 2015, 206-22). 
An appreciation of the descriptive and normative complexity of different 
business firms means that attributions of ethical responsibility require digging 
into the organizational details of specific firms. Others have previously noticed 
the need to adjust ethical theory to the legal variations in the types and sizes of 
business firms, as well as differences in national and cultural contexts (for 
example, Donaldson 1982, 1989). With respect to the ethical responsibility of 
firms, a legal analysis drills down into the organizational structure of a specific 
business to understand who has legal authority for particular decisions and 
who has rights and benefits of ownership. This legal analysis can provide an 
understanding of particular firms that may help to ground agreements unify-
ing both individualists and collectivists on particular attributions of moral 
responsibility. 
Consider again, for example, the case ofVW and its environmental fraud on 
consumers. Important questions to ask when attributing ethical responsibility 
including understanding and, through a proper investigation, finding out who 
actually made the decisions and engaged in the actions to design the "defeat 
devices" that were installed on millions of cars and who knew about these 
decisions and actions. Another important question is who profited from 
these decisions and actions. For example, employees who met productivity 
targets at least in part by means of the fraudulent behavior arguably had "ill-
gotten gains" (cf. Katz 1996). The executives who met internal incentives for 
profit-making by accelerating sales of falsely promoted vehicles are in the 
same boat. Morally speaking, the ill-gotten profits should be returned from 
those who gained to those who were defrauded (or forfeited to the government 
in recognition of its role to protect the environment). Moreover, the ill-gotten 
gains from the fraud should be reversed whether or not a particular employee 
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knew about the fraud, because the profits themselves have been "tainted" by 
the wrongful activity.5 Some owners may also have profited from the wrongful 
behavior. If the economic gains from the fraud were large enough, then the 
stock price of VW would likely have been affected favorably as a reflection of a 
greater perceived economic value of the company.6 If a shareholder sold his or 
her shares just prior to a market correction following the exposure of the 
environmental cheating, then a portion of this realized gain is also arguably 
wrongfully obtained. We may have pragmatic reasons to limit the legal scope 
of moral responsibility in the context of complex corporate ownership struc-
tures, but this is a different matter than a straightforward tracing of moral 
responsibility to the individuals who are responsible for the fraud, knew about 
it, and profited from it. 
Figure 1 provides a stylized example to illustrate how thinking about a 
firm's business participants in a wrongful action can shed light on how we 
think about the attributions of moral responsibility to different individual 
participants and firms qua firms. (For an account of the different business 
participants in firms and how they are related to each other, see Orts 2015.) 
Imagine a firm (perhaps a stylized version of VW) that is making only 
ethical and legal profits through time T1. The firm then begins committing 
massive fraud of some kind at Ti, and at T 2 a wider group of people within the 
firm becomes aware of the fraud, but it is not discovered and reported to 
the public until T 3• Revelation of the fraud causes a significant decline in the 
value of the firm in expectation of the legal and market consequences, which 
include large legal damages and penalties, as well as reputational harm. T 4 and 
T 5 indicate times after which the crisis has occurred and begun to fade, as the 
company stabilizes. The firm may take corrective actions of various kinds at T 4 
5 I thank my colleagues Nico Cornell and Sarah Light for alerting me to the idea of morally 
"tainted" profits which they formulate in an article on "Wrongful Benefit and Arctic Drilling" 
( Cornell and Light (forthcoming 2017) ). This idea relates to what some philosophers call a 
"remedial" or "rectificatory" obligation to return benefits gained from wrongful behavior to those 
who were wrongfully harmed (Butt 2007). Additional support for the intuition that wrongful 
gain from fraud should be transferred back to those defrauded may refer to moral and legal 
conceptions of "corrective justice" (see, for example, Coleman 1992; Weinrib 1992). 
6 I omit here a discussion of the large empirical assumption regarding the reliability of stock 
prices as a measure of the intrinsic economic value of firms and the extent to which stock values 
may be attributable to general market conditions as well as a specific company's economic value. 
The accurate measurement of economic value in specific time windows-such as VW's envir-
onmental fraud and its discovery-is fraught with similar complications. For example, if a fraud 
occurs in a company that had the consequence of returning ill-gotten gains to the company, but a 
different external economic shock occurs at the same time which had greater overall effect, then 
the stock price value would not provide a correct measure of the damage caused by the fraud. 
One might instead use other accounting measures of the fraudulent gain such as tracking profits-
per-vehicle illegally sold in terms of sales and earnings. 
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Time 
Figure I. Time and liability in firms 
and pay any legally required damages or fines at T5 .7 The firm may also make 
efforts to recover its organizational reputation by adopting internal reforms 
and reaching out to "make things right" with its customers.8 
It is interesting to note in this example, as moral individualists emphasize, 
that there are many business participants who may profit from the fraud and 
yet elude any legal responsibility. In theory at least, those who actually 
perpetrate the fraud should be brought to justice-including by the criminal 
law. (In practice, this often doesn't happen for various reasons, as Garrett 
(2014) has recently documented, and as Craig Smith notes in his introductory 
chapter in this book with respect to the legal aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2008 in the United States.) Many people working within VW who knew about 
or condoned the fraud may be difficult to prosecute under the criminal law, 
given high standards of proof ( usually "beyond a reasonable doubt") and state 
of mind requirements (usually actual intent or at least "recklessness"). Also 
most employees within firms are immunized from being sued individually by 
outraged consumers or the government. Internal legal principles of firm 
organization usually protect individual employees. A general shield of"limited 
liability" covers executives, managers, and employees by operation of agency 
law principles, indemnification provisions, and insurance (Orts 2015, 146-51; 
Thompson 1994). A manager or employee who may have known about or 
suspected fraud will usually escape any legal responsibility, even though we 
may think that some moral responsibility should attach to this behavior of 
7 As of this writing, VW had hired Kenneth Feinberg, a legal expert who had previously 
advised compensation for victims ofBP's oil spoil and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for advice (Ivory 
2015). 
8 For an examination of possible public relations strategies that VW might adopt, including 
one proposal for VW to relocate its headquarters to Detroit and adopt hjp-hop advertising, and 
another to crowdsource remedies for environmental damages to consumers, see National Public 
Radio (2015). 
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"looking the other way," especially when the manager or employee may 
benefit from the fraud through increases in compensation by hitting sales 
targets or other goals that the fraud enabled. Recent "clawback" provisions for 
executives who commit major frauds may have begun to address this problem 
to some extent. (See Cherry and Wong 2009; Fried and Shilon 2011.) So far, 
though, these provisions are rather blunt instruments and usually rely for 
enforcement on the firm itself, which in turn is represented by its top 
executives. 
As moral individualists emphasize, there is a concern that punishing a firm 
heavily at the institutional level of the firm itself may visit unjust consequences 
on business participants who are completely innocent of wrongdoing. 
A common example given is the criminal indictment of Arthur Anderson 
for the involvement of some of its partners in the massive Enron fraud and the 
ensuing bankruptcy of Arthur Anderson and loss of thousands of employees' 
jobs. (See the chapters in this book by John Hasnas and Ian Maitland; see also 
Brickey 2003.)9 By the same token, though, the organizational structures of 
firms may serve to protect complicit individuals. This legal reality provides a 
pragmatic argument for visiting moral responsibility somewhere-namely, at 
the level of the firm as a whole-in some circumstances. Otherwise, as Pettit 
argues in his chapter, a moral deficit would open in the other direction. 
The case of VW illustrates also that legal realities track different moral 
theories in different parts of the world. Germany, for example, does not 
recognize corporate criminal liability at the level of the firm (Khanna 1996, 
1490). Elsewhere in Europe, France and the Netherlands have amended their 
laws to allow corporate criminal liability at the firm level (id.). In the United 
States, corporate criminal liability at the firm level has allowed for financial 
cases to be settled for very large amounts of money without any individual 
admitting culpability, which has sparked strong criticism (for example, Garrett 
2014). In response to criticism, the US Department of Justice revised its 
prosecutorial guidelines to focus on the role of individuals in corporate crimes. 
The new guidelines state a "foundational principle" as follows: 
Prosecutors should focus on wrongdoing by individuals from the very beginning 
of any investigation of corporate misconduct. By focusing on building cases 
against individual wrongdoers, we accomplish multiple goals. First, we increase 
our ability to identify the full extent of corporate misconduct. Because a corpor-
ation only acts through individuals, investigating the conduct of individuals is the 
most efficient and effective way to determine the facts and the extent of any 
corporate misconduct. Second, a focus on individuals increases the likelihood 
that those with knowledge of the corporate misconduct will be identified and 
9 Brickey's account provides important context for an assessment of the Arthur Andersen's 
"fall from grace," including the fact that the firm had previous serious problems with regulators 
and prosecutors in major cases and failed to make internal governance changes as a result. 
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provide information about the individuals involved, at any level of an organization. 
Third, we maximize the likelihood that the final resolution will include charges 
against culpable individuals and not just the corporation. (US Department of 
Justice 2015, 9- 28.010) 
It is likely that these standards will increase pressure substantially for pro-
secutors to focus on individual liability for business participants in the future. 
Looking deeply into the "black box" of the firm to see the legal complexity of 
its internal organization proves both individualists and collectivists to be right. 
Although attributions of moral responsibility to individuals may be ideal, 
organizational complexities of legal structure and authority make the case 
for fixing moral responsibility at the firm level, if only for pragmatic reasons. 
This legal perspective finds support in the moral pragmatism recommended 
by Hussain and Sandberg. (See also Dewey 1926.) This pragmatic argument 
does not fully "square" the competing views, but it provides grounds for 
individualists to agree in practice to a compromise legally that may allow 
"the firm" to be designated to carry moral responsibility as a proxy in cases 
when organizational complexities prevent a practical tracing of moral respon-
sibility to all complicit individuals. Both individualists and collectivists may 
also support legal reforms that attempt to track moral responsibility more 
closely to hold specific individuals accountable when acting within and on 
behalf of their firms. One recent intriguing suggestion, for example, would fix 
greater legal responsibility for organizational wrongdoing on the top execu-
tives based on a theory analogous to the traditional view that the captain of a 
ship bears moral responsibility for negligence by inferior officers regardless of 
the captain's own knowledge and behavior (see Sepinwall 2012, 2014). 
Consider now another category of business participants who may use the 
legal structures of firms to escape legal responsibility for ill-gotten gains: its 
owners. Again referring to the stylized facts represented in Figure 1, imagine 
that the firm is a corporation, and shareholders who hold an ownership 
interest at T I and T 2 then sell their shares at T 3 . On the assumption that the 
fraud was massive enough and secret enough (that is, no traders had know-
ledge of the fraud ahead of its actual disclosure or at least did not trade in 
sufficient quantities to correct the stock price), then the shareholder who sold 
at T3 made profits that were at least partly composed of ill-gotten gains from 
the fraud. The well-established principle of limited liability for shareholders in 
corporate law, however, would prevent anyone from legally recovering these 
ill-gotten gains. Note also that for longer term shareholders who hold their 
shares through T3 and continue to hold their ownership interests through T4 
and T 5, there is no injustice because the stock price would readjust to account 
for the negative value of the fraud. 
A recognition of this legal structure of responsibility-or, more precisely, 
the legal "shielding" of responsibility-sheds light on the debate between 
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moral individualists and collectivists. On one hand, a moral individualist may 
respond with an argument for a reform of the corporate law to allow legal 
responsibility to better follow moral responsibility (that is, to enable recovery 
of ill-gotten windfalls to either employees or owners). 10 One might even go so 
far as to argue for a repeal of limited liability for business corporations and 
other organizational entities on moral grounds. (For such an argument on 
economic grounds regarding tort liability, see Hansmann and Kraakman 
1991.) At least, some especially compelling moral arguments may make the 
case for disregarding the corporate entity or "piercing the corporate veil" 
stronger in certain situations (Bainbridge 2001; Orts 2015, 156-68). On the 
other hand, moral collectivists may point to these limitations on legal liability 
as good reason to attribute moral responsibility somewhere, and a likely target 
is the firm itself. 
The legal structure of business enterprise supplies a rationale for the moral 
collectivists' argument in this context. It is true that all of the capital and 
property committed to a business firm such as a corporation is owned, at least 
in the final analysis, by a specified set of individual people.11 The capital 
structure of modern enterprise consists of an often complex amalgamation 
of equity and debt ownership interests (Orts 2015, 71-99). In addition, and in 
part allowing for this complexity of ownership, business firms such as cor-
porations are given the legal authority to "own themselves." A corporation, for 
example, may purchase real estate or capital equipment in its own name. It 
keeps separate books and records that delineate the assets of "the firm" as 
separate from the personal assets of the firm's owners. This "asset partition-
ing" describes an essential feature of the historical development of business 
enterprise (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000; Hansmann, Kraakman, and 
Squire 2006). The corporation, as well as other legal forms of business, has 
the ability to "retain earnings" rather than to distribute them as profits, and its 
managers may decide with broad authority to reinvest earnings in the ongoing 
operations of the firm, including salary raises, or new research and develop-
ment projects (Orts 2015, 99-104). The legal fact that retained earnings are 
allocated initially to the structural capital and property of the firm supports the 
view that some degree of collective responsibility may correctly attach to the 
firm itself. For moral individualists, the capital and property of the firm is 
indeed "owned" by specific people (namely, the equity and debt holders of 
claims on profits of the firm over time). To fix financial responsibility on the 
10 One of my MBA students, Christopher Dahan, accurately points out that taxes on 
increased earnings paid by a fraud-committing firm to the government should also arguably 
be recovered by the firm in order to prevent a windfall from accruing to the government. At least 
in cases of bankruptcy, there is a case to be made that "ill -gotten taxes" should be made available 
to compensate victims of a large fraud or major accident rather than retained by the government. 
11 There is a possible exception regarding government-owned firms or public-public hybrid 
structures which I leave outside of consideration here (see Orts 2015, 194-200). 
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firm in some circumstances on these owners, then, describes a convenience of 
legal administration that violates no moral boundaries even on an individu-
alist account. 
Again to refer to the example ofVW's massive environmental fraud, some 
of the ill-gotten gains are arguably present as "retained earnings" within the 
complex ownership structure of the firm. Even if some of the ill-gotten profits 
may somehow trace to other uses or allocations, the fact that the firm served as 
a nexus of ownership for these distributions of ill-gotten gains would justify 
using the firm's capital itself as a target for compensation. By the same token, it 
seems also true that some owners, as well as executives and employees, may 
unethically profit from the fraud if they "cash out" their winnings between T 1 
and T3• To the extent that these ill-gotten gains are not legally recoverable 
(perhaps for practical reasons of difficulty of "following the money" in 
complex cases), there is a "moral deficit" of accountability for wrongful actions 
that calls for legal redress. 
This legal analysis of moral responsibility in firms presented here is by no 
means complete. It may, however, serve to shed light on some issues that will 
continue to be debated into the future. Continuing discussion of moral respon-
sibility in firms may help to inform and drive legal reform along the lines 
envisioned by John Dewey (1926) in his examination of the "personhood" of 
corporations and, by extension, other business entities. For Dewey, legal forms 
and conceptions reflect larger scale political, ethical, religious, and economic 
debates. In this sense, Waheed Hussain and Joakirn Sandberg's chapter here also 
points in a promising future direction. Perhaps moral as well as legal concep-
tions of moral responsibility in firms should follow a methodology of pragma-
tism. Alternatively, other moral theories of the responsibility of firms advocated 
by various authors in the chapters of this book will, to the extent that they are 
politically and jurisprudentially persuasive, influence how the law of responsi-
bility of firms progresses. In this sense, the debate between individualists and 
collectivists regarding the moral responsibility of firms- and the search for 
common ground between them-will no doubt continue. 
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